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INTRODUCTION
Despite recent rapid growth and poverty reduction, the South 
Asia Region (SAR) continues to suffer from a combination of 
insufficient economic growth, slow urbanization, and huge in-
frastructure gaps that together could jeopardize future prog-
ress. It is also home to the largest pool of individuals living 
under the poverty line of any region, coupled with some of 
the fastest demographic growth rates of any region. Between 
1990 and 2010, the number of people living on less than 
US$1.25 a day in South Asia decreased by only 18 percent, 
while the population grew by 42 percent.1 
If South Asia hopes to meet its development goals and not 
risk slowing down—or even halting—growth and poverty al-
leviation, it is essential to make closing its huge infrastruc-
ture gap a priority. But the challenges on this front are mon-
umental. Many people living in SAR remain unconnected to 
a reliable electrical grid, a safe water supply, sanitary sewer-
age disposal, and sound roads and transportation networks. 
This region requires significant infrastructure investment 
(roads, rails, power, water supply, sanitation, and telecom-
munications) not only to ensure basic service delivery and 
enhance the quality of life of its growing population, but also 
to avoid a possible binding constraint on economic growth 
owing to the substantial infrastructure gap.
For the past two decades, SAR and East Asia and Pacific 
(EAP) have enjoyed similar growth rates, yet SAR lags signif-
icantly behind EAP, Latin America, and the Caribbean (LAC) 
when it comes to access to infrastructure services—with 
certain areas featuring access rates comparable only to 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). At the same time, there are tre-
mendous variations among countries in terms of access to 
infrastructure services. Afghanistan, Nepal, and Bangla-
desh have access rates that resemble the average Sub-Sa-
haran country, while Sri Lanka and the Maldives are more 
similar to Latin American countries in terms of average rates 
of infrastructure services. There are also enormous varia-
tions within SAR countries. Districts with very low access to 
infrastructure can be found in rich Indian states while dis-
tricts with high access can be found in poor states. More-
over, within the same district, high access rates to one ser-
vice (for example electricity) can coexist with low access 
rates to other services, such as sanitation.
It is commonly asserted that the poor have less access to 
infrastructure than the rich, similar to the case of private 
assets. In effect, a non-regressive access to infrastructure 
services would mean no correlation between actual access 
and different poverty related measures (such as households 
below poverty lines, and certain income and consumption 
levels). Whereas this may be desirable theoretically—espe-
cially for infrastructures with high public good characteris-
tics—it is virtually impossible to achieve anywhere in the 
world. For example, location matters, and the choice be-
tween infrastructure access to all, regardless of where indi-
vidual households are located and quality access to where 
most households are located, is a real policy challenge il-
lustrated in its extreme case. While studies on the topic are 
scarce, it is clear that not all countries fare the same in their 
infrastructure service provision, and SAR countries are no 
different. Yet, do some SAR countries fare better with re-
spect to providing infrastructure access to their poor? Are 
there infrastructure sectors that tend to be more regressive 
than others? What is happening with access to infrastructure 
services at the household and individual levels? 
In an effort to shed light on all of these questions, this re-
port takes a critical look at the status of infrastructure in SAR 
compared with other regions, as well as among and within 
1 The proportion of people living on less than $1.25 a day de-
creased from 54 percent to 31 percent (a 42 percent decrease), 
between 1990 and 2010, mainly due to the increase in population.
2 Reducing Poverty by Closing South Asia’s Infrastructure Gap
SAR countries. It then explores inequality of access to infra-
structure services across South Asia’s space (namely phys-
ical space, poverty space, and income space) and across 
time (how access of the young will influence future oppor-
tunities). Next, the report gives an estimate of the total cost 
of regional infrastructure needs, along with the infrastruc-
ture investment trends in SAR countries, and proposes a 
framework on how to rank infrastructure needs. Finally, the 
report examines ways to better use existing resources by re-
thinking infrastructure service provision—including the role 
of the private sector—and policy options to help the poorest 
gain better access to infrastructure. 
Our conclusion is that infrastructure deficiencies in South 
Asia are enormous, and a mix of investment in infrastruc-
ture stock and implementing supportive reforms will enable 
the region to close its infrastructure gap. As for the size of 
the infrastructure gap, we estimate that SAR needs to invest 
between US$ 1.7 and US$ 2.5 trillion (at current prices) in 
infrastructure until 2020.2 In GDP terms, if investments are 
spread evenly over the years until 2020, SAR needs to in-
vest between 6.6 and 9.9 percent of 2010 gross domestic 
product (GDP) per year—which would be an increase of up 
to three percentage points from the 6.9 percent of GDP in-
vested in infrastructure by SAR countries in 2009. 
Faced with this enormous demand for infrastructure invest-
ment, and with only limited available financial resources, 
it is critical for SAR to prioritize infrastructure investment 
needs. The criteria used to accomplish this must be able 
to answer questions about short-term needs versus longer-
term development needs, especially in developing coun-
tries. For example, should infrastructure investment in the 
electricity sector be given priority over the transport sector? 
Given substantial lock-ins associated with infrastructure in-
vestments, should a country continue attempting to fill cur-
rent gaps or direct investments to infrastructures that are 
likely large bottlenecks in the medium term? Moreover, it 
is not feasible to expect South Asian governments alone to 
shoulder the entire financial burden, underscoring the need 
for a bigger role for the private sector (such as through pub-
lic-private partnerships). 
In addition, South Asian governments need to ensure that 
infrastructure access is extended to the people who need it 
the most: women, the poor, and marginalized social groups. 
There are no simple guidelines to follow however, given the 
tremendous variations among and within SAR countries as to 
who has access to infrastructure services (in terms of phys-
ical location, income, and age). For example, while leading 
regions generally have better levels of access, many poor ar-
eas enjoy levels of access that are similar to those of rich ar-
eas. Plus some infrastructure services (like water) are more 
equally distributed than others (like sanitation). That is why 
providing some level of access is a start—even if those ser-
vices are not of the highest quality. At the same time, poli-
cy makers should take into account which types of services 
best fit each population’s needs (such as septic tanks for a 
mountainous region but sewerage lines for a more accessi-
ble urban area). 
HOW SOUTH ASIA COMPARES WITH 
OTHER REGIONS
The demand for infrastructure has been growing global-
ly, especially in Asia, driven by a myriad of factors such as 
economic growth, technological progress, and urbaniza-
tion—putting greater and greater pressure on infrastructure 
services that are already severely stretched. According to 
the United Nations, five South Asian cities (Mumbai, Del-
hi, Kolkata, Karachi, and Dhaka) are expected to surpass 
the 15 million-person mark by 2015. Furthermore, accord-
ing to the livability index produced by the Economist Intelli-
gence Unit, four South Asian cities (Dhaka, Karachi, Kath-
mandu, and Colombo) are in the bottom 10 cities out of the 
140 countries evaluated. 
Yet structural change in South Asian countries has been rel-
atively slow compared to that of East Asian countries—espe-
cially since 1990, when they had similar urbanization rates 
(SAR, 25 percent; EAP 28 percent) and were close in terms 
of infrastructure service provision. While they both enjoyed 
high growth rates over the next two decades, EAP has seen 
rapid urbanization (50 percent in 2012) while SAR has re-
mained the least urbanized region in the world (31 percent), 
well below the world urbanization rate (53 percent). In ef-
fect, departing from similar points, South Asian countries 
2 The US$1.7 to US$ 2.5 trillion are at current prices, and they are 
equivalent to US$1.4 to US$2.1 trillion at 2010 prices.
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are remarkably “under-urbanized” when compared to East 
Asian countries over the past half century.
How large is SAR’s infrastructure gap compared with oth-
er regions? At this point, its access to infrastructure services 
closely resembles SSA, even though its economic growth is 
second only to EAP (table 1). 
 Electricity access. In SAR only 71 percent of the pop-
ulation enjoys the benefits of electricity access, ahead 
of SSA at 35 percent, but way behind the rest of the re-
gions at above 90 percent. According to businesses in 
South Asia, infrastructure is a major or severe hindrance 
to their growth, and electricity is the largest problem. 
 Improved sanitation access. In this category, SAR 
(39 percent) is at the bottom with SSA (30 per-
cent)—rates that are close to half the world average of 
64 percent population access. Open defecation seems 
to be one of the most salient issues facing SAR—which 
ranks as the region with the highest incidence of open 
defecation in the world—with 680 million people 
(41 percent of the population) relying on it in 2011.3 
 Improved water access. This is the only indicator where 
South Asia is about even with the rest of the world and 
EAP, averaging 90 percent population access. Yet the 
quality and quantity of improved water may be in ques-
tion. Most of the access to water is through public 
stands; only 25 percent of the population has access to 
piped water and 24/7 water supply is a rare exception 
in South Asian cities.4
 Telecom access. Communication among people who 
are not in close proximity is inefficient. In terms of tele-
com access (measured as fixed and mobile lines per 
100 people), SAR and SSA rank at the bottom (72 and 
54) with less than half the access found in ECA and 
LAC (157 and 125).This situation becomes even more 
dramatic given SAR’s low level of urbanization.
 Transport access. This other form of connectivity is also 
poor—a problem that troubles much of the developing 
world. Using total length of road network per 1,000 peo-
ple, SAR has 2.9 km—which is close to EAP (2.5 km), 
SSA (2.5 km), and MNA (2.8 km), but well below the 
world average (4.7 km), ECA (8 km), and North Amer-
ica (24 km). Furthermore, the transport infrastructure 
suffers from serious shortcomings (such as lack of intra-
regional connectivity among the national road networks, 
TABLE 1: SAR LAGGING BEHIND ALL BUT SSA IN ACCESS TO INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES 
Avg GDP 
Growth 
(2000–2012)a
Urbanization 
Rate (2012)
Telecom 
Access (per 
100 people) 
(2011)b
Electricity 
Access (% 
of pop.) 
(2010)c
Access to 
Improved 
Sanitation (% of 
pop.) (2011)d
Access to 
Improved Water 
(% of pop.) 
(2011)e
East Asia and Pacific (EAP) 8.9% 50 98 92 67 91
Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA)
4.4% 60 157 100 94 95
Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC)
3.1% 79 125 94 81 94
Middle East and North Africa 
(MNA)
4.2% 60 105 94 89 89
South Asia Region (SAR) 6.7% 31 72 71 39 90
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 4.7% 37 54 35 30 63
World 2.5% 53 103 78 64 89
Source: World Development Indicators, except when noted otherwise.
Notes: a The average GDP growth for MNA is for the period 2000–2009; b Telecom access is defined as the number of fixed and mobile lines; c World 
Energy Outlook 2010 by International Energy Association; d Improved sanitation is defined as connection to a public sewer, a septic system, pour-
flush latrine, simple pit latrine, and ventilated improved pit latrine; e Improved water is defined as household connection, public standpipe, borehole, 
protected dug well, protected spring, rainwater collection.
3 WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program 
4 Ibid.
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unrealized potential for rail and inland water freight 
transport, and inadequate road and rail connectivity of 
ports with hinterlands). These limitations turn transport 
infrastructure into a hindrance for regional and interna-
tional trade, as indicated by investment climate surveys.
HOW ACCESS TO INFRASTRUCTURE 
VARIES WITHIN SOUTH ASIA 
So who has access to each type of infrastructure? We be-
gin with a cross country comparison among South Asian 
countries and then we look at inequality of access across 
South Asia’s region, weighing physical (“spatial”), poverty, 
and income spaces—an assessment that has never been 
done before for SAR.5 Mapping access to infrastructure with 
characteristics of households provides a better understand-
ing of the issues limiting access for some groups of the pop-
ulation, and allows for better design and targeting of policies 
to expand access to infrastructure services. 
Benchmarking within South Asia
Sri Lanka and Maldives have the best access rates in the re-
gion. More than 90 percent of their population has access to 
improved sanitation, which is better than in LAC at 81 per-
cent. In terms of electrification, only Maldives (95 percent) 
and Sri Lanka (77 percent) are above the average rate for 
developing countries (76 percent).6,7 On telecom, Sri Lanka 
and Maldives top the lists with 104 and 173 telephone lines 
per 100 people. This places Sri Lanka almost at the world 
average of 103 lines per 100 people and above EAP (98 
lines per 100 people).
Afghanistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh have the worst access 
rates in the region. Nepal, with the lowest number of tele-
phone lines per 100 people in SAR (47), is behind Af-
ghanistan (54) – which matches SSA (54). For electrifica-
tion, Afghanistan, not surprisingly, is the worst; a meager 
30 percent of the population can rely on electricity powered 
lighting at night. Moreover, Afghanistan and Bangladesh 
5 See Biller et al. (2013) for a detailed discussion about the meth-
odology in this section.
6 It should be noted that data sources are kept the same for con-
sistency purposes when comparing countries. The Ceylon Electric-
ity Board (CEB) estimates for example that over 90 percent of Sri 
Lankan households were electrified in 2011.
7 World Energy Outlook/International Energy Association (IEA): 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energydevelopment/
globalstatusofmodernenergyaccess/.
TABLE 2: BIG RANGE AMONG SAR COUNTRIES IN ACCESS TO INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES
Access to Infrastructure Services in SAR countries
Telecom Access 
(per 100 
people) (2011)a
Electricity 
Access (% of 
pop.) (2010)b
Access to 
Improved 
Sanitation (% of 
pop.) (2011)c
Access to 
Improved Water 
(% of pop.) 
(2011)d
Total Road 
Network (km per 
1000 people)e
% Paved 
Roadsf
Afghanistan (AFG) 54 30 29 61 1.6 29
Bangladesh (BGD) 58 47 55 83 0.1 10
Bhutan (BTN) 69 65 45 97 9.7 40
India (IND) 75 75 35 92 3.5 50
Maldives (MDL) 173 95 98 99 0.3 100
Nepal (NPL) 47 76 35 88 0.8 54
Pakistan (PAK) 65 67 47 91 1.5 72
Sri Lanka (LKA) 104 77 91 93 5.5 81
Source: World Development Indicators, except when noted otherwise.
Notes: a Telecom access is defined as the number of fixed and mobile lines; b World Energy Outlook 2010 by International Energy Association, 
except BTN and MDV, which are based on authors’ estimations; c Improved sanitation is defined as connection to a public sewer, a septic system, 
pour-flush latrine, simple pit latrine, and ventilated improved pit latrine; d Improved water is defined as household connection, public standpipe, 
borehole, protected dug well, protected spring, rainwater collection; e Varying data years: 2005 (MDV), 2006 (AFG), 2008 (IND, NPL), 2010 (BGD, 
BTN, PAK, LKA); f Varying data years: 2003 (LKA), 2005 (MDV), 2006 (AFG), 2008 (IND, NPL), 2010 (BGD, BTN, PAK).
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(47 percent) are closer to the 35 percent found in SSA than 
to the 71 percent found in SAR. Total road network (km) per 
1000 people is also low in Nepal, Afghanistan, and Ban-
gladesh—in Maldives it is also low, but it is explained by 
geographical reasons. And only 29 percent of Afghanistan’s 
roads, and 10 percent of Bangladesh’s roads, are paved.
The exception is high average access to improved water in SAR, 
and not just in a few countries. Five out of the eight countries 
in SAR (i.e., Bhutan, India, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lan-
ka) have access rates to improved water of at least 90 per-
cent, similar to the 94 percent rate found in LAC.
Inequality across physical space
One way of judging inequality is to analyze whether some 
countries in South Asia do a better job of making access to in-
frastructure more equal within the country spatially than oth-
ers. We do this by focusing on a lower administrative level 
(such as a district or province) and measuring inequality with 
Gini coefficients.8 A Gini coefficient of zero represents per-
fect equality, while a coefficient of one represents maximal 
inequality. Our goal is to come up with a country-level mea-
sure of spatial inequality of infrastructure access adjusted by 
household spatial distribution, which is presented in table 3.
The results show quite a varied picture, with the Maldives 
having the lowest—and Afghanistan the highest—inequal-
ity of access to infrastructure services in the region. These 
results are not surprising, especially in the case of Afghan-
istan, given its level of development and years of conflict. 
What is surprising, however, is Pakistan’s relatively low levels 
of spatial inequality. One possible explanation is the coun-
try’s higher urbanization rate, with access to infrastructure 
services more skewed to its cities relative to other countries 
in the region.
We can also ask whether some infrastructure services fare 
better than others in terms of how they are distributed with-
in countries to households. Again, the results show large 
variations. The most unequally distributed service through-
out SAR is cooking gas (Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG))—
likely reflecting its reliance on transport connectivity and 
its capital-intensive nature (it is mostly distributed in bot-
tles). This heavy use of biomass for cooking, rather than the 
cleaner LPG, affects mostly children and women through 
indoor air pollution. In Sri Lanka, as Figure 1 shows, there 
are “mountains” of firewood and poverty.9 
TABLE 3: TREMENDOUS INEQUALITY OF ACCESS ACROSS SAR’S PHYSICAL SPACE
Gini Coefficients of Access to Infrastructure in South Asia
Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
 Access Gini Coefficients Adjusted by Household Distribution
Improved Water 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.06 –0.10 0.04 0.02 0.01
Improved Sanitation — –0.01 0.18 0.29 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.01
Electricity 0.49 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.04 — 0.04
Cooking Gas 0.50 0.49 0.22 0.35 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.33
Phone 0.28 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.03
Source: Authors’ calculations based on surveys presented in Andres et al. (2013).
Note: The Gini coefficients are estimated over a sample of administrative subdivisions selected on each country. An access Gini coefficient adjusted 
by household distribution of one expresses maximal inequality. An adjusted coefficient of zero expresses perfect equality.
8 The first step is to estimate a Gini coefficient over total households 
that have access to a given type of infrastructure service at the ad-
ministrative level. But given that differences in the distribution of 
the access could be determined by where the households are allo-
cated in the country, we actually estimate the Gini coefficient over 
the number of households of each administrative area. The next 
step is to subtract the Gini coefficient of population from the Gini 
of connections to see if there are areas in a country that are not re-
ceiving a rate of access proportional to their population. Access to 
a particular infrastructure service is spatially evenly distributed if its 
Gini coefficient is equal to the Gini coefficient of households—al-
though this could also mean an equal absence of services. 
9 Improved water is a noticeable outlier in the Maldives which may 
be explained by small atolls having more access in relative terms 
because of the inclusion of rain water in improved water.
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The most equally distributed service throughout SAR is im-
proved water, which is important in terms of welfare im-
pacts given that no one can survive without it. The other 
sectors—improved sanitation, electricity, and phones—fall 
somewhere in between the two extremes. Households, ap-
propriately or not, generally solve their own sanitation needs, 
so the incentives to invest in adequate technologies are 
more limited than in the case of water. Like water, electric-
ity is a direct benefit to the household as opposed to sani-
tation. One would expect that households are willing to pay 
more for adequate electricity, however appropriate electrici-
ty services can be costly.
Inequality across poverty space
Another way of judging inequality is to analyze how pock-
ets of poverty fit into the picture, in effect, introducing a 
socio-economic variable. We assume that a country with 
a higher poverty rate will have worse access to infrastruc-
ture services than a country with a lower one; but how 
strong is that link? To do this, we correlate the district pov-
erty rate (percentage of people of each district that live 
under the poverty line) with the district rate of access to 
infrastructure (percentage of households that have infra-
structure in each district) for India, Afghanistan, and Sri 
Lanka. This correlation helps us understand the income 
regressivity of access to these services by sector—that is, 
to what extent income (being above or below the poverty 
line) and access move together. In this analysis, high re-
gressivity means that poor districts typically have less ac-
cess compared to richer districts, whereas low regressivi-
ty means access is more equitably distributed among poor 
and rich districts alike. 
Our results show that overall the link is regressive, but the 
strength of that link varies greatly among the countries and 
among sectors.
 India shows strong regressivity of infrastructure service 
access, except in water and phone services (Figure 2). 
The water exception is similar to that in the other coun-
tries.
 Sri Lanka shows a relatively weak regressivity of infra-
structure service access (Figure 3). The exceptions to 
this trend are cooking gas and phone, which show a 
much stronger link. 
 Afghanistan shows a relatively strong regressivity, ex-
cept in water and in Kabul (its capital), an area with 
one of the country’s lowest poverty rates (Figure 4). 
Cooking gas seems less regressive than in India and 
Sri Lanka.
Inequality across physical and poverty space 
Yet another question that we can explore, this time by 
bringing together poverty data and physical access data 
for India and Sri Lanka, is whether poorer regions with-
in a country have less access to key public services as a 
whole. We do this by constructing two infrastructure in-
dexes10—which encompass only the basic infrastructure 
services that have the highest impact on welfare (such as 
water, sanitation, and electricity)11—and then use these to 
generate maps depicting how poverty and the location of 
infrastructure services intersect. 
Our results show that leading regions generally mean better 
access but lagging regions do not necessarily mean worse 
FIGURE 1: SRI LANKA’S MOUNTAINS OF FIREWOOD 
AND POVERTY
Total Population that Uses Firewood for Cooking Relative to Poor 
Households
High usage
Low usage
High poverty
Low poverty
Color
Height
Note: This is an inverted view of Sri Lanka for visual purposes. The red 
peaks indicate both high usage and high poverty. The solid blue color 
area with no mountains indicates the absence of data for the north 
and part of the east. 
10 The two methods are: (i) equal weights; and (ii) multicriteria de-
cision-making approach assigning weights according to household 
level infrastructure service importance.
11 Maps could be generated for each infrastructure service, but this 
analysis is easier done via other means as discussed later in the 
paper.
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access. As expected, in India the lagging states (those with 
a higher poverty level) have higher access to basic infra-
structure, in contrast with the leading states (those with a 
lower poverty level). This is intuitively expected. The curi-
ous exception is the northeast area bordering Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, China, and Myanmar. The exception found in In-
dia is more prevalent in Sri Lanka, where basic infrastruc-
ture seems to be more inclusive. Access is widely spread, 
and the quality of these services in the country is known to 
be generally good. It is clear that the leading region—the 
Western Province—enjoys better access and a lower pov-
erty rate. Yet, for the lagging provinces, the story is more 
mixed, except for those where the country’s 30-year conflict 
was more present.12
FIGURE 2:  INDIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES ACCESS IS STRONGLY REGRESSIVE
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
R
at
e 
of
 A
cc
es
s
0 20 40 60 80
Poverty Rate
a. Electricity
India Access to Infrastructure and Poverty Rates, in Percent
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
R
at
e 
of
 A
cc
es
s
0 20 40 60 80
Poverty Rate
b. Cooking Gas (LPG)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
R
at
e 
of
 A
cc
es
s
0 20 40 60 80
Poverty Rate
c. Improved Sanitation
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
R
at
e 
of
 A
cc
es
s
0 20 40 60 80
Poverty Rate
d. Improved Water 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
R
at
e 
of
 A
cc
es
s
0 20 40 60 80
Poverty Rate
e. Phone
Source: Authors’ calculations based in infrastructure access from India DHLS-3 and poverty rates from Debroy and Bhandari (2003). 
Note: The size of each point is based on the population size.  The coefficients associated with the scatter plots are –0.89 (significant at 99% of 
confidence) for electricity, –0.44 (significant at 99% of confidence) for cooking gas, –0.67 (significant at 99% of confidence) for improved sanita-
tion, –0.02 for improved water, and –0.64 (significant at 99% of confidence) for phone.   
12 See Biller et al. (2013) for further discussion on this issue.
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FIGURE 3: SRI LANKA’S INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES ACCESS IS ONLY WEAKLY REGRESSIVE
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Source: Authors’ calculations based in Sri Lanka HIES 2010. 
Note: The size of each point is based on the population size. The coefficients associated with the scatter plots are: –1.51 (significant at 99% of 
confidence) for electricity, –2.34 (significant at 99% of confidence) for cooking gas, –0.25 for improved sanitation, –0.9 for improved water, and for 
phone –1.69 (significant at 99% of confidence.
Inequality across income space
One question that still remains is how equitably access is 
distributed across different income levels—that is, for those 
with access, is it the richer individuals who have the bulk of 
the access or do richer and poorer individuals tend to have 
more similar access? This matters because it allows policy 
makers to better target policies to expand access. To answer 
this question, we compared income quintiles and access 
rates for Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. 
Our results show that in Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, the 
rich enjoy better access than the poor, but the countries 
differ greatly in how equal that access is across incomes. 
In Sri Lanka, the difference in access across quintiles is 
small—all quintiles are close to the mean—meaning that 
there is an almost equal share of access to infrastructure 
regardless of income quintile. The opposite story is true in 
Afghanistan. 
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However, some services (like water) are more equitably dis-
tributed than others (like cooking gas) among those with ac-
cess. In Afghanistan, the equality of access across income 
quintiles is particularly striking for improved water. Whether 
poor or rich, the shares of quintile over the total connection 
in the country hardly deviate from the mean. This is particu-
larly remarkable given that access to improved water is very 
low in the country—significantly lower than all other coun-
tries in South Asia and the region’s average. Regardless of 
years of conflict and scarcity of service, it seems that the Af-
ghani society has emphasized sharing household access to 
water. Whether in Sri Lanka or Afghanistan, the use of cook-
ing gas is particularly prevalent for the highest quintile, mak-
ing it the rich’s form of cooking. The reason, as discussed, 
is the capital intensive nature of LPG, its reliance on network 
connectivity, and the easy available of cheaper, albeit inferi-
or, alternatives.13
FIGURE 4: AFGHANISTAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES ACCESS IS REGRESSIVE
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Source: Authors’ calculations based in Afghanistan NVRA 2008. 
Note: The size of each point is based on the population size. The coefficients associated with the scatter plots are –0.03 for improved water, –0.39 
(significant at 90% of confidence) for electricity, –0.36 for cooking gas and –0.66 (significant at 95% of confidence) for phone.
HOW ACCESS TO INFRASTRUCTURE 
AFFECTS OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUTH
So how unequal is access to infrastructure among children? 
After all, infrastructure investment choices to fill the infrastruc-
ture gap made today affect current and future generations. 
Moreover, not addressing the infrastructure gap threatens both 
welfare and economic growth in the medium and long term. 
The Human Opportunity Index: Access to 
Infrastructure as Opportunity
Our main instrument for measuring the inequality of ac-
cess to infrastructure across time is the Human Opportuni-
ty Index (HOI), which was first published in 2008, and was 
used to evaluate access in Latin America. It essentially mea-
sures how personal circumstances impact a child’s proba-
bility of accessing the services that are necessary to suc-
ceed in life. This is critical because the opportunities a child 
gets throughout life are determined directly by the circum-
stances related to access to infrastructural services during 
13 This has been underscored in the literature as well; see Kojima et 
al. (2011) and Kojima (2011).
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their formative years—not necessarily to their personal deci-
sions or level of effort. 
This study calculates an HOI that is focused on basic infra-
structure as opportunities, and the importance of both im-
proving overall access to it and ensuring its equitable allo-
cation to achieve key socio-economic outcomes—such as 
early childhood development, education completion, good 
health, and access to information. It can be interpreted as 
a composite indicator of two elements: (i) the level of cov-
erage of basic opportunities necessary for human devel-
opment (such as access to primary education, water and 
sanitation, or electricity); and (ii) the degree to which the 
distribution of those opportunities is conditional on circum-
stances children are born into (such as gender, income, or 
household characteristics). For this study we have select-
ed four circumstances: (i) household size, (ii) location (ur-
ban versus rural), (iii) education of household head, and (iv) 
gender of household head.14
Inequality of Opportunity in the Access to 
Infrastructure Services
Our results show that typically, South Asian countries with 
better infrastructure coverage also provide more equitable 
access for households with children under 15, thereby of-
fering higher HOIs. Take the case of improved sanitation (ta-
ble 4). As expected, countries with the highest coverage (the 
Maldives and Sri Lanka) feature the lowest dissimilarity in-
dex, and therefore, the HOI is very close to the coverage. In 
contrast, countries with low levels of coverage (such as Ban-
gladesh) are associated with higher discount rates, and thus 
lower HOIs. However, if we take two similar access rates, 
such as in the case of India (36 percent) and Nepal (37 per-
cent), we see a significant difference in how that access to 
sanitation is distributed, with Nepal (0.14) being more even 
than in India (0.24)—which results in India having a lower 
HOI (0.27) than Nepal (0.32). Also, a country with higher 
coverage, like Pakistan (44 percent), but featuring the same 
dissimilarity index as India (and thus higher than for Nepal), 
still ends up with a higher HOI than India but with a similar 
one to that of Nepal. In the case of access to improved wa-
ter, rates are high enough to guarantee a low dissimilarity in-
dex. Electricity also follows the pattern of decreasing dissim-
ilarity index as coverage is higher.
Can we ascertain how much individual circumstances drive 
the HOIs for each type of infrastructure? We explore this by 
looking at all 9 types of infrastructure, and then calculating 
both the dissimilarity/inequality index and HOI for each indi-
cator, and then the contribution of each circumstance to the 
HOI. A few patterns stand out:
 Indicators linked to a higher quality of access register 
significantly higher inequality of opportunity than more 
standard, general indicators of access (improved water 
source versus piped water, improved sanitation versus 
sewerage). Hence, general indicators of access hide 
differences in types of access among different circum-
stance groups.
 At the country level, two factors—the location of the 
household (urban versus rural) and the education of 
the household head—explain over 70 percent of the 
HOIs across countries and across indicators (most of 
the times, over 80 percent).
 In the case of India, at the state level location is still a key 
factor, but the role of education of the household head, 
and in a few cases, household size, gain in importance in 
explaining HOIs. And while the contribution of gender of 
the household head seems negligible at the country lev-
el, there are a number of states where access is unevenly 
distributed among female and male headed households.
PINNING DOWN THE 
“INFRASTRUCTURE GAP”
Over time, societies inherit man-made infrastructure stock 
from previous generations. Yet different factors influence de-
mand and supply, and as countries grow these needs—both 
the type of infrastructure and the quality of service provi-
sion—are likely to evolve. In this report, we assess the in-
frastructure gap using a four-step process, as illustrated in 
Figure 5. It shows (1) where a country is today; (2) where a 
country would like to be at a given point in time; (3) the dif-
ference between the two points (i.e. the infrastructure gap- 
how far business-as-usual scenarios, shown by the dotted 
14 These circumstances reflect previous inequality of opportunities 
studies and are in line with similar analyses that are part of the SAR 
Regional Flagship Report on Inequality of Opportunities (forthcom-
ing in 2014).
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blue line, will take the country toward reaching its goal);15 
(4) how far financial and policy options using existing re-
sources (shown by the dotted red line) could take the coun-
try toward reaching its goal; and (5) the remaining financial 
gap that will need to be bridged. Keep in mind that the im-
portance of the financial gap will vary among countries, de-
pending on how well better use of existing resources can 
close the infrastructure gap. 
At this point, most governments in SAR have some esti-
mates of the investments required to reach certain targets, 
such as 24/7 electricity supply and the MDGs in water and 
sanitation, but those estimates are not consistent across the 
TABLE 4: BETTER COVERAGE TYPICALLY GOES WITH MORE EQUITABLE ACCESS AND THUS HIGHER HOIs 
Access to Infrastructure Services and Human Opportunity Index for household with children under 15 years old
Country Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
Year 2008 2006 2007 2007 2009 2011 2006 2010
Improved Sanitation 
Coverage — 45% 38% 36% 94% 37% 44% 90%
Dissimilarity Index — 0.15 0.24 0.24 0.01 0.14 0.23 0.03
HOI — 0.38 0.29 0.27 0.93 0.32 0.34 0.87
Improved Water
Coverage 46% 98% 96% 83% 86% 88% 92% 88%
Dissimilarity Index 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.02
HOI 0.41 0.97 0.95 0.80 0.78 0.86 0.91 0.86
Electricity
Coverage 17% 50% 72% 68% 100% 75% — 85%
Dissimilarity Index 0.58 0.20 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.08 — 0.05
HOI 0.07 0.40 0.63 0.60 1.00 0.69 — 0.81
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NVRA 2008 for Afghanistan, MICS 2006 for Bangladesh, BLSS 2007 for Bhutan, DLHS-3 for India, DHS 
2009 for Maldives, DHS 2011 for Nepal, DHS 2006 for Pakistan and HIES 2010 for Sri Lanka. All estimations represent the proportion of access 
in the sample with children below 15 years of age. 
Note: The column coverage is estimated over the predicted values of access to infrastructure for each household. Piped water is restricted – “Piped 
water in the premises.” For the Bangladesh improved water rate of access we did not use the assumption made by JMP where they discard 
20 percent of protected wells due to arsenic contamination. For Bangladesh improved sanitation data, to make rates comparable, we include as JMP 
pit latrines without slabs in the category of improved sanitation (when is categorized as unimproved). For further information about these changes in 
the JMP methodology check JMP data by country (http://www.wssinfo.org/documents-links/documents/?tx_displaycontroller[type]=country_files). 
Due to the lack of information about landlines in Bhutan the definition of phone (mobile and landlines) is the same as mobile phones. Sri Lanka 
sewerage connection is not presented because it is not identifiable in the data. For Pakistan, there is no information about the tenancy of mobile 
phones in the household. The lack of information about access to electricity in Pakistan is caused by significant differences with the official data 
(World Energy Outlook) which motivates us to think the estimates in these countries are not comparable definitions of access to electricity. 
15 Given that (3) is the sum of (4) and (5), the four steps are (1), 
(2), (4), and (5).
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region. That is why we developed different methodologies 
for different sectors. These models also allow us to calcu-
late and compare the costs of different sets of targets. Each 
model was applied to one country, which gives five sector-
country combinations: (i) power – Nepal; (ii) transport – 
Sri Lanka; (iii) water and sanitation – India; (iv) solid waste 
management – Sri Lanka; and (v) irrigation – Afghanistan. 
So how much money will be needed to close the infrastruc-
ture gap? We estimate that SAR needs to invest US$ 1.7 to 
US$ 2.5 trillion in infrastructure until 2020—equivalent to 
US$ 1.4 to US$ 2.1 trillion at 2010 prices (table 5).16 Going 
forward, a mix of investing in infrastructure stock and imple-
menting supportive reforms will enable the region to close its 
infrastructure gap. In GDP terms, if investments are spread 
evenly over the years until 2020, SAR needs to invest be-
tween 6.6 and 9.9 percent of 2010 GDP per year—an in-
crease of up to 3 percentage points from the 6.9 percent of 
GDP invested 2009 (table 6). 
What are the odds that SAR can put together enough funds 
to meet these investment targets? An inspection of past in-
frastructure investment trends suggests this will be difficult 
to do.17 Certainly, the 2009 level of 6.9 percent is much high-
er than the 1973 level of 4.7 percent, although there were 
many fluctuations around this trend from 1973 to 2011. The 
main driver of these fluctuations, especially in the 1980s, 
was electricity generation—which accounts for more than 
a third (37 percent) of the total portfolio during this period. 
In contrast, investment in transport (31 percent), irrigation 
(15 percent), and water supply and sanitation (7 percent) 
were much more stable, although telecom (11 percent) has 
been on a steady rise.
As expected, these overall patterns have been largely driven 
by India, which contributes the biggest share of total infra-
structure investment in South Asia during the 1973–2009 pe-
riod. In fact, infrastructure investment in India makes up on 
average 79 percent of total investment in the region. The sec-
ond largest contributor—Pakistan—has an average share of 
only 12 percent, and is followed by Bangladesh with 7.9 per-
cent, Nepal with 1.0 percent, and Bhutan with 0.2 percent. 
16 See Andres et al. (2013) for the description on the methodology 
for computing these estimates.
17 While the main source of the data for these investments are 
multi-year development plans prepared by the National Planning 
Commissions, annual reports from ministries, state banks, and oth-
er related government agencies have also been used in order to 
form as much as a complete picture as possible. The data used is 
a mixture of estimated and actual expenditure, as not all plans state 
actual expenditure from the previous plan or fiscal year. Further-
more, these plans do not distinguish between Capital and Opera-
tional Expenditures (CAPEX and OPEX). For public sector invest-
ment, South Asia is defined as: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, 
and Pakistan. Afghanistan, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka are not in-
cluded in this definition due to data limitations.
TABLE 5: SAR’S TOTAL INVESTMENT TAB COULD REACH AROUND $2 TRILLION
(Investment Requirements 2011–2020 (total, in billions of dollars 2010)
 Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka SAR (5)a SAR (8)b
 Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High
Transport 36.0 45.0 340.0 595.0 3.7 5.5 17.2 21.5 10.8 18.0 408 685 411 691
Electricity 11.0 16.5 375.0 468.8 5.3 7.0 64.0 96.0 4.8 9.0 460 597 464 603
WSSc 12.0 18.0 95.0 162.0 1.7 2.6 9.3 14.0 0.6 1.8 119 198 120 200
Solid Waste 2.1 4.2 32.5 65.0 0.4 0.5 3.3 6.7 0.2 1.3 39 78 39 78
Telecom 5.0 5.0 150.0 225.0 0.4 0.6 12.4 12.4 2.0 2.5 170 246 171 248
Irrigation 7.7 11.6 140.0 210.0 1.6 2.3 9.7 14.6 2.5 3.1 161 242 163 244
Total 74 100 1,133 1,726 13 18 116 165 21 36 1,356 2,045 1,369 2,064 
Source: Andres et al. (2013).
Note: Estimations based on the technical models as well as the extrapolations for the other sectors where the models were not run. 
a SAR (5): Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. b SAR (8): Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and 
Sri Lanka. Based on an extrapolation from SAR (5) estimates. c WSS: Water Supply and Sanitation. 
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These differences in the shares of total infrastructure invest-
ments in the region are roughly in line with the relative size 
of each economy. The average infrastructure investment as a 
percentage of GDP for the period 1973–2009 hovers around 
6 percent for India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, and 5 percent 
for Nepal. Bhutan, with infrastructure investments represent-
ing 14.6 percent of its GDP, has given significantly higher im-
portance to infrastructure development. 
Given that a significant share of the infrastructure invest-
ment in the years ahead will have to come from the private 
sector, it is interesting to note that some sectors—such as 
energy and telecom—have drawn a lot more private investor 
interest than others (table 7).18, 19 On a country level, while 
India has the largest presence by far, with 85 percent of re-
gional private investment commitments, it follows Bhutan 
and Maldives, in terms of proportion of investment commit-
ments with respect to GDP.
Of these investments, as Figure 6 shows, some sectors at-
tract full privatization more than others. In transport, the pri-
vate sector tends to partner with the public sector through 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs); while in telecoms, it 
tends to invest by itself (regulated privatization). When it 
comes to energy, the private sector chooses to invest main-
ly by itself, but also through partnerships with the public 
sector. Many of the PPPs in the power sector in South Asia 
TABLE 6: CLOSING SAR’S INFRASTRUCTURE GAP WILL REQUIRE INVESTING A HIGHER SHARE OF GDP
Investment Requirements 2011–2020 (% of GDP, per year)
 Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka SAR (5)a
 Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High
Transport 3.60 4.50 1.97 3.44 2.32 3.49 0.98 1.23 2.17 3.64 1.97 3.31
Electricity 1.10 1.65 2.17 2.71 3.34 4.46 3.66 5.49 0.97 1.82 2.22 2.89
WSSb 1.20 1.80 0.55 0.94 1.08 1.62 0.53 0.80 0.12 0.37 0.57 0.96
Solid Waste 0.21 0.42 0.19 0.38 0.24 0.30 0.19 0.38 0.04 0.27 0.19 0.38
Telecom 0.50 0.50 0.87 1.30 0.27 0.40 0.71 0.71 0.40 0.50 0.82 1.19
Irrigation 0.77 1.15 0.81 1.21 0.99 1.48 0.55 0.83 0.50 0.63 0.78 1.17
Total 7.38 10.02 6.55 9.98 8.24 11.75 6.63 9.44 4.21 7.23 6.55 9.89
Source: Andres et al. (2013).
Note:These percentages are based on the investment requirements at 2010 prices. They are based on the technical models as well as extrapola-
tions for the other sectors where the models were not run. 
a SAR (5): Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. b WSS: Water Supply and Sanitation.
happen in generation (60),20 mainly through build-operate-
transfer arrangements. This is despite the fact that PPPs are 
the optimal organizational structure in transmission, not in 
generation or distribution. 
Even so, public provision is still the norm in South Asia. 
According to the World Bank Private Participation in In-
frastructure Database,21 there are fewer than 1,000 active 
projects in the energy, telecom, transport, and water and 
sanitation sectors under PPPs or fully owned by the pri-
vate sector.22 This number is low when compared with the 
18 The core source for private sector investment is the World Bank 
Private Participation in Infrastructure Database (for a detailed ex-
planation on the PPI methodology, refer to: http://ppi.worldbank.
org/resources/ppi_methodology.aspx). In this section, Private Par-
ticipation in Infrastructure (PPI) investment consists of all eight 
countries in the region—Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, 
the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
19 Irrigation is not included in the definition of infrastructure for 
this section. This is primarily because there is not enough data 
available but also because irrigation is primarily a public sector 
domain.
20 As of August 2013, there are 69 active projects in the power sec-
tor under lease contract, concession, or Build, Operate, Transfer 
(BOT), according to the World Bank Private Participation in Infra-
structure Database 
21 http://ppi.worldbank.org
22 The database considers 7 possible statuses for a project (i.e., 
cancelled, concluded, construction, distressed, merged, operation-
al, under development). We consider a project is active, if it is not 
cancelled or concluded. 
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more than 400 power plants in the region; the extension 
of the electricity transmission network; the large number 
of cities where electricity distribution, water, and sanitation 
networks exist or are needed; the more than 400 seaports 
and airports; and the extension of the road network. 
PRIORITIZING INFRASTRUCTURE 
INVESTMENT 
Which investment projects should SAR countries tackle first, 
or even second, third, and fourth? Not surprisingly, how to pri-
oritize investment projects or portfolios is a common question 
a government at any jurisdictional level asks. This question is 
especially critical in developing countries, particularly in South 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, where demand for investment is 
huge and financial resources are limited. A few existing stud-
ies attempted to address this question,23 but the methodolog-
ical framework they developed is narrow and can be applied 
only to rank infrastructure investment projects.
For that reason, we developed a methodology to help priori-
tize infrastructure needs in developing countries, particular-
ly in South Asia. It consists of three main steps: (i) Identi-
fying factors that affect infrastructure investment decisions, 
(ii) Quantifying identified factors, and (iii) Ranking the infra-
structure projects. Table 8 presents some stylized rankings, 
which relate infrastructure services according to input intensi-
ty of use, degree of spatial manifestation, typical development 
outputs, and commonly debated market failures. The infra-
structure services listed often fall under the public sector, but 
in some cases may be a combination of public and private 
provision. For example, sanitation via off-site systems is typ-
ically provided by public utilities, but on-site sanitation such 
as septic tanks are generally private investments. The list is 
not meant to be exhaustive and provides ranks from 1 to 3, 
with 1 being the lowest relative weight, based on the existing 
literature on infrastructure services and its impacts.
How much financial resources should be allocated to infra-
structure development, within infrastructure sectors, and 
other sectors (such as health, education, public safety, and 
national defense)? This is another question asked by all de-
veloping countries, but unfortunately, there is no rule to deter-
mine the investment allocations.24 It depends on a country’s 
priority, economic growth, and welfare objectives. Considering 
that infrastructure is both a means to facilitate this econom-
ic growth and development, and a measure of the former, one 
TABLE 7: PRIVATE INVESTORS FAVOR ENERGY AND TELECOM
(Total Private Sector Investment Commitments in Current US$ Mil (1990–2012)
 
Water Supply 
and Sanitation Transport Energya Telecom Total
% of total 
PPIb
% of GDP 
(2007–2012)
Afghanistan 0 0 2 1,683 1,685 0.47 0.01
Bangladesh 0 0 3,285 6,855 10,140 2.83 1.14
Bhutan 0 0 201 18 219 0.06 2.65
India 470 81,098 135,703 89,054 306,325 85.49 2.57
Maldives 0 478 0 84 562 0.16 4.09
Nepal 0 0 997 135 1,132 0.32 0.66
Pakistan 0 2,555 13,416 17,090 33,061 9.23 1.59
Sri Lanka 0 740 1,438 3,003 5,181 1.45 1.04
SAR 470 84,871 155,042 117,922 358,305 100 2.34
Source: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure Database.
Note: % of GDP was computed as a simple average across the specified period. For Afghanistan, % of GDP is from 2001-2011 due to a lack of data. 
a Energy entails a combination of electricity and natural gas. b PPI: Private Participation in Infrastructure.
23 See, for example Berechman and Paaswell (2005); Karydas and 
Gifun (2006).
24 Some existing literature attempted to address this question. 
Based on information from a previous study (Fay and Yepes, 
2003), Estache and Fay (2010) estimate that developing countries 
might need 6.5% of their GDP, in average, during 2005–2015 peri-
od. Of which 2.3% would be needed to maintain the existing infra-
structure and 3.2% for new infrastructure projects.
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could expect that a higher share of GDP (including funds re-
ceived from bilateral and multilateral donors) would need to 
be allocated for infrastructure investment. This is the case, at 
least, for developing countries, where there is greater scarci-
ty of man-made and human capital related to infrastructure. 
That said, there is a false dichotomy between prioritizing 
large-scale infrastructure versus addressing the needs of 
the poor. At a very basic level, this dichotomy is false be-
cause many large-scale infrastructure investments may 
concurrently facilitate economic growth and increase the 
welfare of poorer populations. An example of this is a large 
transport project that may primarily target facilitating trade 
of raw materials, but at the same time it may also connect 
isolated poorer populations to better services.
A more interesting debate is at which stage of development 
a particular infrastructure investment has a higher impact 
on economic growth versus welfare. For instance, a pow-
er distribution project may have large welfare impacts giv-
en that it enables education and health outcomes, which 
may in turn translate into future economic growth as a more 
educated, healthier labor force joins the labor market in 
the medium to long run. Yet, it may also facilitate growth in 
manufacture today, which in turn may promote short-term 
economic growth. Given that most power sources are limit-
ed, there is a clear policy choice related to power allocation 
for different usages. Instruments such as tariffs and other 
incentives play a vital role in allocating this scarce resource. 
Moreover, policy makers should be cognizant that attempt-
ing to apply the same standards across the board regardless 
of income may translate into no provision to the poor. 
Ultimately, both types of investments are needed—those that 
clearly target economic growth in the short run and those 
that attempt to reduce poverty in the short run. The right 
combination as well as the level at which design and imple-
mentation take place is highly dependent on country level 
institutions, the policy makers’ objectives, and the econom-
ic characteristics of the infrastructures under consideration. 
POLICY OPTIONS TO PROVIDE BETTER 
INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES
What exactly are the policy options that South Asian policy 
makers should focus on to improve the level and quality of 
services provision for their diverse populations? 
First, rehabilitate and maintain existing assets. South Asian 
governments should invest in rehabilitating and maintaining 
FIGURE 6: ELECTRICITY AND TELECOM FAVOR PRIVATIZATION WHILE TRANSPORT AND WSSa FAVOR PPPs
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infrastructure assets to deliver services efficiently and sus-
tainably, moving away from the “build, neglect, and rebuild” 
mindset. Lack of adequate infrastructure maintenance is 
quite common across developing countries. In India, the 
Working Group on Roads for the National Transport Devel-
opment Policy Committee reports a 40–50 percent short-
fall in the maintenance allocation for state highways and 
major district roads. Under-spending on maintenance of 
infrastructure has direct and indirect costs. Without reg-
ular maintenance, physical infrastructure can rapidly fall 
into disrepair, requiring expensive reconstruction to bring it 
back to adequate standards. For example, the cost of full 
reconstruction of roads that have been poorly maintained 
is, on average, at least three times the cost of maintenance 
(World Bank, 2005). Lack of adequate maintenance trig-
gers a progressive deterioration of the quality of the infra-
structure services, which hurts users (e.g., higher costs 
because of imperfect and costly substitutes, worse social 
outcomes in health and education) and development out-
comes. In India, the National Transport Development Poli-
cy Committee estimates that poor road maintenance costs 
the country about Rs 350 billion annually. 
While funds for new construction are sometimes easier to 
obtain and implement, those for maintenance are more dif-
ficult as they need to be sustained on a regular basis. Differ-
ent mechanisms can be implemented in different infrastruc-
ture sectors to improve maintenance. In the road sector, 
some governments have adopted or considered adopting 
a “road fund” type of arrangement for supporting mainte-
nance. Under such arrangements, maintenance funds are 
assured from a mandated tax on gasoline and diesel, and 
are deposited into an assured and independently operated 
fund. A Board that includes the public sector, or the private 
sector, or possibly both oversees this fund. 
Second, reform service providers and ensure financial/opera-
tional sustainability. Service providers should be financially 
viable, able to plan and implement sound investment strat-
egies, and improve operational performance for the long 
term. This requires: i) Reliable, steady, and adequate reve-
nue streams to fund operations and investment; ii) Capaci-
ty and independence without threat of political interference; 
and iii) Appropriate incentives for becoming and remaining 
more efficient. 
Third, establish solid legal, policy, and regulatory frame-
works. South Asian governments need to have solid le-
gal and policy frameworks; as well as transparent, well de-
signed, and implemented regulatory framework for both 
public and private operators; in order to attract private in-
vestment in line with the best organizational form for each 
service. For example, governments across the region need 
to set the conditions for an even bigger role of the private 
sector in a service such as power generation, which is bet-
ter suited for liberalization than PPPs. Additionally, they shift 
the public resources and efforts toward other services where 
the public sector has the comparative advantage (Box 1). 
Fortunately, when the private sector investment in infra-
structure in SAR, it tends to choose the optimal organiza-
tional forms. These frameworks provide clarity to the private 
sector, increasing the attractiveness of private participation 
in infrastructure projects. They also allow the public sector 
to clearly define responsibilities and manage the risks asso-
ciated with private sector participation. A stable yet dynam-
ic regulatory framework for infrastructure services is particu-
larly critical for: i) Attracting and supporting desired levels of 
investment, ii) Ensuring service sustainability, iii) protecting 
customers, and iv) Guarding the public interest. 
Fourth, decentralize service provision in an appropriate man-
ner. SAR countries should be rethinking how much to decen-
tralize (i.e., distribute the administrative powers or functions of 
a central authority over a less concentrated area) as a means 
of improving service delivery for the smallest units of soci-
ety (households and individuals). As the World Bank’s 2004 
World Development Report puts it: “Decentralization can be 
a powerful tool for moving decision making closer to those af-
fected by it. Doing so can strengthen the links and account-
ability between policymakers and citizens—local governments 
are potentially more accountable to local demands. It can also 
strengthen them between policymakers and providers—local 
governments are potentially more able to monitor providers. 
But local governments should not be romanticized. Like na-
tional governments they are vulnerable to capture—and this 
might be easier for local elites on a local scale.”
In practice, the experience with trying to decentralize infra-
structure service delivery is mixed—the biggest problem of-
ten being a mismatch (often financial or fiscal in nature) be-
tween responsibilities in infrastructure service delivery and 
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the access of the poor—keeping in mind the following five 
principles.
Access is fundamental, but usage determines impact. That is 
why policy makers should complement access to infrastruc-
ture with policies to incentivize the use of services, or make 
potential benefits more obvious or attainable. One way to do 
this is to focus on subsidizing (implicitly or explicitly and with 
sunset clauses) the infrastructures that provide the greatest 
public benefit (public good) in contrast to those that provide 
large private benefits. This should be true across infrastruc-
ture sectors as well as within sectors. Another way is to focus 
on improving women’s access to services, as the improve-
ment in household outcomes can be larger when women 
the ability to execute such responsibilities. But when de-
centralization succeeds, it is thanks to: (i) A fully democrat-
ic, transparent, and inclusive (of the beneficiaries) local de-
cision process; (ii) The cost of local decisions fully borne by 
local government; and (iii) No spillover of benefits to other 
jurisdictions. 
POLICY OPTIONS TO HELP 
THE POOREST GAIN BETTER 
INFRASTRUCTURE
At the same time as South Asian governments are mov-
ing to improve the overall level and quality of infrastruc-
ture services, they must take deliberate steps to improve 
BOX 1: OPTIMAL ROLES FOR THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS
There is no single service provision approach that is better than the alternatives for all infrastructure services and under all degrees of insti-
tutional development. In this report, we examine four possible organizational forms—with varying levels of public and private participation: 
(i) traditional provision, (ii) PPP, (iii) regulated privatization, and (iv) liberalization (deregulated privatization). Following Engel et al. (2009), we 
assume that private firms build, operate, and maintain the infrastructure under all of these forms, and hence, the benefits of each form stem 
from the incentive structure—not the degree of private participation. Depending on the features of each infrastructure service, one of the four 
organizational forms brings the highest social welfare.
When market liberalization is optimal
Power generation is an example of an infrastructure service that is produced under constant or decreasing returns to scale, and for which user 
fees can be charged. In cases like this, the optimal organizational form is market liberalization (that is, privatization plus price deregulation). 
Competition together with private ownership induces firms to select optimal life-cycle cost saving investments and provide the optimal service 
quality, thereby solving the trade-off between productive efficiency and quality considerations.
When traditional  provision is optimal
In the case of flood control, which is a non-excludable service, it is not possible for the government to set service standards that are enforceable. 
Furthermore, quality considerations dominate productive efficiency, making traditional provision the optimal organizational form. If the costs 
of quality reduction were not as important as the benefits of reducing life-cycle cost, then a PPP would be preferred over traditional provision. 
Similarly, if it were not possible to charge fees for the use of a service, but service standards could be designed and enforced, then a PPP would 
be the optimal organizational form.
When PPPs are optimal
This occurs when the service is produced under increasing returns to scale (i.e., natural monopoly) or there are technical aspects that create 
barriers to entry (e.g., the scarcity of radio spectrum for wireless communications), conditions that would rule out market liberalization. So in a 
case like power transmission —which is a natural monopoly, and where expansion requires significant network planning—PPPs would dominate 
over regulated privatization. PPPs have the advantage of leaving the government with the authority to decide on future expansions. The same 
applies for most transport services.
When regulated privatization is optimal
This occurs when competition is not feasible (e.g., because of increasing returns to scale or technical and/or legal entry barriers), user fees can 
be collected, the government can design and enforce service standards, and planning is best done at the firm level. Hence, regulated privatiza-
tion is optimal for power distribution, and ICT services (fixed and mobile). In the latter case, network externalities are important, creating the 
need to regulate interconnection charges. Regulated privatization is also optimal for sanitation and water services, particularly at the distribution 
level in the latter case. An issue of planning and coordination in the use of a natural resource that is beyond the project level arises in water 
production or catchment, which makes PPPs the optimal organizational form in water production. 
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benefit fully from access. Still another way is to focus on en-
hancing quality and maintenance, which are major issues in 
South Asia, as there are an average 42 power shortages a 
month and 21 water shortages a month. 
Ability-to-pay for access to infrastructure services cannot 
be the only instrument to determine provision. Infrastructure 
services have strong market failure characteristics, under-
scoring the need for adequate regulation. Some infrastruc-
tures are still close to natural monopolies (such as pipe wa-
ter and off-site sanitation services). Many are associated 
with strong externalities (negative and positive) and public 
good (and bad) characteristics, as in the case of a lack of 
pollution treatment or a lack of access to cooking gas. Infor-
mation issues also abound. Moreover, since infrastructure 
may act as a spur to growth, relying on the ability-to-pay cri-
terion might undercut efforts to reduce poverty. 
Some infrastructure programs are too costly to be sustainably 
implemented without cost-recovery mechanisms that allow 
them to be self-supporting. The trade-off between providing 
access to infrastructure services and fully charging for these 
services is seldom an easy one to equate. It involves un-
derstanding the economic characteristics of particular in-
frastructure sectors and the technology available for provi-
sion under different physical, political, and socio-economic 
conditions. Take the case of piped water provision, which 
is a private good. It has important market failures associat-
ed with it, but essentially individual households have clear 
incentives to pay for a superior service compared to other 
forms of getting water in an urban environment. Yet, piped 
water is seldom charged to attain full cost recovery and of-
ten relies on direct or indirect subsidies that burden public 
budgets. Nonetheless, the expansion of piped water provi-
sion is often part of political manifestos during election cam-
paigns. Now take the case of flood control, which is a pub-
lic good. Direct cost recovery mechanisms (like tariffs) are 
difficult to design, but the lack of adequate flood control in 
a locality for example can cause substantial costs to house-
holds via the loss of private assets and lives. Budgetary allo-
cation for flood control is often inadequate and the service 
is underprovided. 
The likely aim of the policy maker is to attain a certain de-
gree of balance in infrastructure access (especially basic 
infrastructure), while allowing for wealthier populations to 
shoulder most of the burden of improving coverage for all. 
Given the equality achieved in improved water in South Asia, 
one would be tempted to conclude that this objective is pres-
ent as the service expands. But this conclusion might con-
ceal rent-seeking behavior, where the wealthier capture pro-
portionally larger amounts of rents that otherwise could be 
used for expansion and quality improvement for all and not 
just a few. The literature also argues that infrastructure ser-
vice expansion is closely linked to rent seeking, since rich-
er districts are better able to lobby the government for infra-
structure provision (Cadot et al., 1999). 
Although subsidies may improve affordability among under-
privileged groups, they can also have the effect of increasing 
income inequality. Subsidies tend to be captured by those 
who have political connections, which, at least among un-
connected households, tend to be the more middle class 
households. Wodon and Ajwad (2002) found that in Boliv-
ia and Paraguay, the marginal benefit of improved access to 
a service tended to be two to three times higher among the 
upper two quartiles. Thus, while all income quartiles ben-
efited from decentralization, the richer 50 percent benefit-
ed more than the poorer 50 percent, a net effect that would 
tend to increase income inequality. Estache (2005) points 
out that in Latin America as much as 60 to 80 percent of 
cross-subsidy schemes “were aimed at households well 
above the poverty threshold, while as much as 80 percent 
of poor households failed to benefit.” Thus, it is not surpris-
ing that even as absolute levels of connection increase, re-
gressivity in access to infrastructure may still prevail.
MENU OF INSTRUMENTS 
These principles, in turn, would point to the following menu 
of instruments: 
Subsidies for connection rather than service consumption. 
To avoid some of the drawbacks of subsidies, policy mak-
ers can adopt measures that reduce the cost of providing 
network services or improve the ability of poor households 
to pay for service at a given cost (Komives et al., 2005). 
These would be available only to unconnected households, 
reducing or eliminating the price customers have to pay 
to connect to the system. Alternatively, policy makers can 
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user groups can contribute to planning and operations; 
NGOs can help with monitoring and evaluation, promoting 
social accountability and raising awareness; and the private 
sector can get involved with investment and delivery (An-
dres and Naithani, 2013). These alternative mechanisms, 
which are context-specific, are becoming part of the policy 
toolkit as they are tested and mainstreamed.
CONCLUSIONS
If South Asia hopes to meet its development goals and not 
risk slowing down—or even halting—growth, poverty alle-
viation, and shared prosperity—it is essential to make clos-
ing its huge infrastructure gap a priority. Even though SAR’s 
economic growth follows that of EAP, its access to infrastruc-
ture rates (sanitation, electricity, telecom, and transport) are 
closer to that of SSA—the one exception being water, where 
SAR is comparable to EAP and LAC. According to business-
es in South Asia, infrastructure is a major or severe hin-
drance to their growth, and electricity is the largest problem. 
Transport is also an obstacle for regional and international 
trade. The good news is that policy makers do not have to 
choose between growth and welfare, as there is enormous 
potential for them to be mutually supportive.
The cost to close this gap by 2020 will be an estimated US$ 
1.7 to US$ 2.5 trillion. If investments are spread evenly over 
these years, SAR needs to invest between 6.6 and 9.9 per-
cent of 2010 GDP per year—an increase of three percent-
age points over the current 6.9 percent invested by SAR 
countries in 2009, up from 4.7 percent in 1973. This in-
crease was driven mainly by the region’s large investment in 
electricity generation. 
The challenge of increasing access to infrastructure servic-
es across South Asia is compounded by the inequality in the 
distribution of existing access for households and individuals. 
That is why providing some level of access is a start—even if 
those services are not of the highest quality. At the same time 
policy makers should take into account which types of servic-
es best fit each population’s needs (such as septic tanks for 
subsidize lower service levels that the better off find less at-
tractive, such as social connections. 
Targeted interventions. Usually these instruments are cen-
tered narrowly on a certain district or group that is perceived 
as underserved. This approach has the advantage of few-
er spillovers—that is, there is less likelihood that the inter-
vention ends up benefitting those who were not intended 
to be its beneficiaries. In Mexico, this is now being tried 
with a program that provides conditional cash transfers for 
the poorest segments of the population, named Oportuni-
dades (“Opportunities”). Under this program, energy subsi-
dies were channeled using the same targeting mechanisms 
so these funds are reaching the poorest population in the 
country. A note of caution here, however, is that because 
these interventions are operating only within impoverished 
and underserved areas, they may face issues like inade-
quate staffing, funding, technical capacity, and lack of polit-
ical will (Menéndez, 1991).
Institutional groups. There are also a number of options to 
design programs to reduce elite capturing and increase the 
power of impoverished groups to allocate resources toward 
their priorities. These include:
 Institutional re-centering. Organizations can be creat-
ed whose primary concern is to reduce poverty through 
providing infrastructure. For instance, Bolivia’s Emer-
gency Social Fund was a temporary organization that 
was created to finance infrastructure projects in under-
served communities. 
 Community participation. Incorporating transparent 
mechanisms for underserved people to easily provide 
input into the design and decision-making process 
behind infrastructure projects could pote low them 
to compete with the more informal mechanisms that 
richer populations use to influence decision-making 
(Menéndez, 1991).25
Innovative mechanisms. Service delivery mechanisms need 
to evolve to respond to the challenges of coverage, afford-
ability, use, and sustainability. This is particularly important 
given that poor households tend to pay more for services 
when they have to obtain them through non-network so-
lutions. For example, community-based organizations and 
25 The way incentives are designed play an important role in mitigat-
ing rent seeking. Community Driven Development Projects are par-
ticularly concern with elite capture even within poor communities.
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a mountainous region but sewerage lines for a more acces-
sible urban area). Our study sheds light on who has access 
in terms of space (a current framework) and in terms of time 
(future generations). Countries with higher per capita income 
(like the Maldives and Sri Lanka) enjoy better access to in-
frastructure services both spatially (geographically within the 
country) and income. This is despite the fact that conflict ar-
eas are clearly worse off. Among sectors in SAR countries, 
some, such as water, tend to be more equally distributed than 
others (such as sanitation, energy, and phones). One surpris-
ing discovery is the widespread use of firewood for cooking, 
especially among the poor. Moreover, within SAR countries, 
some states and districts have better access than others. In 
addition, leading regions within a country typically have better 
access but lagging regions do not necessarily have worse ac-
cess. However, if a poorer country or a poorer state can have 
better access to a given infrastructure service than in a richer 
country or a richer state, then there is hope that policy mak-
ers can adopt measures that will improve access in a manner 
that increases shared prosperity. 
There is no simple explanation for these inequalities, al-
though certainly geography matters, policy intent matters, 
and some household characteristics matter. At the country 
level, household characteristics like location and education 
are the main explanatory factors. Location seems obvious, 
but education does not—unless it is linked to income pov-
erty and remoteness of household location (even among ru-
ral areas). At the state level, education actually starts to be-
come a bigger factor than at the country level. While the 
contribution of gender of the head of the household seems 
negligible at the country level, there are a number of states 
(and districts within them) where access is clearly biased to-
wards male-lead households.
Given the size of the gap and limited fiscal and financial re-
sources, it is essential for SAR to prioritize infrastructure in-
vestments. We propose a generic methodological framework 
for doing just that, building on the existing literature. It is 
not desirable to have a single methodology, providing a sin-
gle ranking of infrastructure investments, because of the 
complexities of infrastructure investments. Rather, a mul-
tidisciplinary approach should be taken. Decision makers 
will also need to account for factors that are often not eas-
ily measured. While having techniques that enable logical 
frameworks in the decision making process of establishing 
priorities is highly desirable, they are no substitute for con-
sensus building and political negotiations. 
SAR also needs to rethink the infrastructure service paradigm 
to bring in the private sector and decentralize administrative 
powers functions. The sheer size of the gap and the macro-
economic situation in South Asia dictate that the region taps 
other funding sources. However, this situation should also 
be seen as an opportunity to rethink and improve how in-
frastructure services are delivered. One way to do this is by 
broadening service provision to give the private sector a big-
ger role—whether through PPPs or regulated privatization 
and market liberalization. Another way is by giving greater 
administrative powers and functions to lower levels of gov-
ernments, although the degree to which such decentraliza-
tion is desirable will depend on the nature of the investment, 
the reason it is being provided, how it is being financed, and 
where it is located. 
Policy choices should be aimed at increased shared pros-
perity. Key principles to keep in mind are: (i) Access is fun-
damental but usage determines impact; (ii) Ability-to-pay 
for access cannot be the only instrument to determine pro-
vision; (iii) Some infrastructure programs are too costly to 
be sustainably implemented without cost-recovery mecha-
nisms that allow them to be self-supporting; (iv) Market fail-
ures need to be corrected to avoid rent-seeking behavior; 
and (v) Subsidies should be designed in a way that they 
do not exacerbate income inequality. The menu of possible 
instruments includes subsidizing connections (rather than 
service consumption), adopting targeted interventions, cre-
ating organizations dedicated to reducing poverty through 
providing infrastructure, and asking NGOs to help with mon-
itoring and evaluation, promoting social accountability, and 
raising awareness. 
If shared prosperity is one of the ultimate goals of policy mak-
ers, it is important to get accurate infrastructure data. The ex-
isting data allowed us to create a baseline for tracking prog-
ress in closing the infrastructure gap and to answer some 
questions about who has access to infrastructure services 
now and how that is likely to affect future generations—and 
thus the equality of opportunities across the region. This 
work can be expanded and improved by considering more 
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circumstances, along with exploring alternative indicators of 
access, use, and quality of infrastructure services. However, 
in order to do that, better data is needed. Without it, private 
and public investments may miss their targets of leveling the 
playing field and end up increasing inequality of infrastruc-
ture service provision.
REFERENCES
Ajwad, M. I., and Q. Wodon. 2002. “Who Benefits from In-
creased Access to Public Services at the Local Level? A 
Marginal Benefit Incidence Analysis for Education and Ba-
sic Infrastructure.” In Washington DC: World Bank Econo-
mists’ Forum (Vol. 2, pp. 155–175).
Andres, L. and S. Naithani. 2013 “Mechanisms and Approach-
es in Basic Service Delivery for Access and Affordability.” 
Washington DC: World Bank.
Andres, L., D. Biller, and M. Herrera-Dappe. 2013. “Infrastruc-
ture Gap in South Asia: Infrastructure Needs, Prioritization, 
and Financing.” Washington DC : World Bank.
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics and UNICEF. 2007. Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 2006. Dhaka, Bangla-
desh: Ministry of Planning and UNICEF.
Berechman, J. and R. E. Paaswell. 2005. “Evaluation, prioriti-
zation and selection of transportation investment projects 
in New York City,” Transportation, Vol. 32, pp. 223–249
Biller, D., L. Andres, and M. Herrera Dappe. 2013. “Inequality 
of Access to Infrastructure Services in South Asia .” Wash-
ington DC: World Bank.
Cadot, O., L. H. Röller, and A. Stephan. 1999. “A political econ-
omy model of infrastructure allocation: an empirical as-
sessment,” (No. FS IV 99–15). Discussion papers//WZB, 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forsc-
hungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensent-
wicklung.
Debroy,B. and L. Bhandari. 2003. “District-level Deprivation in 
the New Millennium.” Rajiv Ghandi Institute for Contem-
porary Studies and Indicus Analytics.
Debroy, Bibek. District-level deprivation in the new millennium. 
Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2003.
Department of Census and Statistics. 2009–10. “Household In-
come Expenditure Survey (HIES).” Ministry of Finance and 
Planning, Colombo.
Engel, E., R. Fischer, and A. Galetovic. 2009. “Public-Private 
Partnerships: When and How.” Centro de Economía Apli-
cada, Universidad de Chile, HYPERLINK “http://ideas.
repec.org/s/edj/ceauch.html” Documentos de Trabajo 257.
Estache, A. 2005. “On Latin America’s Infrastructure Experi-
ence: Policy Gaps and the Poor.” ”, in J. Nellis and N. 
Birdsall (2005), Reality Check: The Distributional Impact 
of Privatization in Developing Countries, Center for Global 
Development. 281–296.
Estache, A. and M. Fay. 2010. “Current Debates on Infrastruc-
ture Policy.” Globalization and Growth: Implications for a 
Post-Crisis World. M. Spence and D. Leipziger Eds. World 
Bank, Washington, DC.
Fay, M. and T. Yepes. 2003. “Investing in Infrastructure: What 
is needed from 2000–2010”. Policy Research Working Pa-
per 3102, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Institute for Population Sciences. 2007–08. “District Level 
Household Survey (DLHS-3).” Ministry of Health and Fam-
ily and Welfare, Delhi.
Karydas, D.M. and J.F. Gifun. 2006. “A method for the efficient 
prioritization of infrastructure renewal projects,” Reliability 
Engineering & System Safety, Vol. 91, No. 1, pp. 84–99.
Kojima, M. 2011. “The Role of Liquefied Petroleum Gas in Re-
ducing Energy Poverty.” Extractive Industries for Develop-
ment Series No. 25, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Kojima, M., R. Bacon, and X. Zhou. 2011. “Who Uses Bottled 
Gas? Evidence from Households in Developing Countries,” 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 5731, World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
Komives, K., J. Halpern, V., Foster, Q. Wodon, and R. Abdullah. 
2005. “Water, Electricity, and the Poor: Who Benefits from 
Utility Subsidies?, World Bank, Directions in Development, 
Washington, DC.
National Institute of Population Studies (NIPS) [Pakistan], and 
Macro International Inc. 2008. Pakistan Demographic and 
Health Survey (DHS) 2006–07. Islamabad, Pakistan: Na-
tional Institute of Population Studies and Macro Interna-
tional Inc.
Luis Andrés, Dan Biller, and Matías Herrera Dappe December 2013 23
Vulnerability Analysis Unit. 2007–08. “National Risk Vulnera-
bility Assessment (NRVA).” Ministry of Rehabilitation and 
Rural Development and Central Statistics Organization, 
Government of Afghanistan, Kabul. 
World Bank. 2004. “World Development Report 2004: Mak-
ing Services Work for Poor People.” Washington: World 
Bank.
World Bank Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 
(PPIAF). 2013. “Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory 
Facility Database.” World Bank, Washington DC. http://
ppi.worldbank.org/index.aspx
World Bank. 2005. “Why Road Maintenance Is Important and 
How to Get it Done.” Transport Note No. 4.
World Bank. 2013. “World Development Indicators.” http://
data.worldbank.org/country
World Health Organization (WHO)/United Nations Chil-
dren’s Fund (UNICEF) Joint Monitoring Pro-
gramme (JMP) for Water and Sanitation. 2013. http://
www.wssinfo.org/documents-links/documents/?tx_
displaycontroller[type]=country_files 
National Statistics Bureau. 2011. “Bhutan Living Standards 
Survey (BLSS) 2007.” Royal Government of Bhutan, 
Thimpu, Bhutan.
Menendez, A. 1991. Access to basic infrastructure by the ur-
ban poor (No. 28). World Bank Publications.
Ministry of Health and Family (MOHF) [Maldives] and ICF 
Macro. 2010. Maldives Demographic and Health Survey 
(DHS) 2009. Calverton, Maryland: MOHF and ICF Macro.
Ministry of Health and Population (MOHP) [Nepal], New ERA, 
and ICF International Inc. 2012. Nepal Demographic and 
Health Survey (DHS) 2011. Kathmandu, Nepal: Ministry 
of Health and Population, New ERA, and ICF Internation-
al, Calverton, Maryland.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD)/ International Energy Agency (IEA). 2010. “World 
Energy Outlook 2010.” Paris: France. 
Paes de Barros, R., F. H. Ferreira, J. R. Molinas Vega, and J. 
Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. “Measuring Inequality of Op-
portunities in Latin America and the Caribbean.” Wash-
ington DC: Palgrave MacMillan and The World Bank

Acknowldgements
fully acknowledged. 
Photo credits:
Power
Telecom
Irrigation
TAIMANI FILMS / WORLD BANK
Water
Roads
Development.. Picture by Graham Crouch/World Bank
SA infrastructure gap Cover 1-6-14.indd   3-4 1/6/14   1:50 PM
Reducing Poverty by 
Closing South Asia’s 
Infrastructure Gap
Luis Andrés,
Dan Biller, and
Matías Herrera Dappe
December 2013
SA infrastructure gap Cover 1-6-14.indd   1-2 1/6/14   1:50 PM
